The European Court of Justice has held that as from 21 December 2012 insurers may no longer charge men and women differently on the basis of scientific evidence that is statistically linked to their sex, effectively prohibiting the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums and benefits for the purposes of insurance and related financial services throughout the European Union.
Introduction
It is given that differentiation based on stereotyping or on unsupported prejudice amounts to discrimination and should therefore be prohibited. But what about differentiation based on accurate statistical findings? This is the type of differentiation most commonly used in The European Court of Justice ('ECJ') has held that as from 21 December 2012 insurers may no longer charge men and women differently on the basis of scientific evidence that is statistically linked to their sex, effectively prohibiting the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums and benefits for the purposes of insurance and related financial services throughout the European Union.
2
This ruling marks a sharp turn away from the traditional view that insurers should be allowed to apply just about any risk assessment criterion, so long as it is sustained by the 
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3 findings of actuarial science. The naïveté behind the assumption that insurers' recourse to statistical data and probabilistic analysis, given their scientific nature, would suffice to keep them out of harm's way was exposed. In this article I look at the flaws of this assumption and question whether this judicial decision, whilst constituting a most welcome landmark in the pursuit of equality between men and women, has nonetheless gone too far by saying too little on the million-dollar question of what separates admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination.
No argument is made in this article against the ECJ's ruling that sex should not be used as a risk assessment criterion in the insurance business. Whilst this article will focus on sex, some of my conclusions also apply to the use of statistical findings as justification of a differentiation based other suspect classifications set forth in Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 'Charter').
I argue that sex should not be used as a risk assessment criterion because in some if not all instances where sex has been used as such in the insurance business it cannot be shown that statistical differences related to sex are unrelated to past forms of discrimination, and because a person's sex has not been shown to be the only or even a deciding factor for outcomes relevant to insurance, but is rather used as a convenient surrogate criterion for other, more determining features.
I argue, more generally, that a twofold test consisting of the following questions should be used so as to separate admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination: 1. Is there evidence in support of the conclusion that the statistical findings under consideration have an explanation that is unrelated to some form of past discrimination? This question should be answered affirmatively in order for the differentiation to pass this part of the test. 2. Comparing the actuarial factor under scrutiny
4 with every other possible factor, is there evidence to support the conclusion that that there is no other known factor which (i) would have been more suitable as a predictor of the relevant outcome or (ii) which would have been equally or even slightly less suitable for that purpose but which would have been less burdensome from a human rights perspective?
This question should also be answered affirmatively in order for the differentiation to pass this part of the test.
The article is divided into eight sections, including this introduction (1) and the conclusions (8). Section 2 sets out the legal provisions which form the background to the ensuing discussion. Section 3 contextualizes a person's sex as one of a series of suspect classifications and briefly presents the notion of rational discrimination so as to characterize the type of discrimination most commonly used in the insurance business. Section 4 outlines the reasons behind the popularity of sex as a risk assessment criterion in the insurance business. Section 5 draws on a couple of landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court taken in the different but related context of racial discrimination in America in order to illustrate why it is vital that a stricter test than the rational standard be applied to any attempt to differentiate on the basis of a suspect classification so as to separate admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination.
Section 6 lays down the above mentioned twofold test aimed at separating admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination based on statistical findings. Section 7 points out that, even though the use of sex as an actuarial factor has failed that test, a different outcome might well lie ahead if, also in the context of insurance, the test were to be applied to another suspect classification, such as a person's age. membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.'
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Surely differentiation based on stereotyping or on unsupported prejudice amounts to discrimination and should therefore be prohibited. But what about so-called rational discrimination? 20 In this article I take issue with one particular form of such rational discrimination: that of differentiation based on accurate statistical findings, which is the type of differentiation most commonly resorted to in the insurance business, an insurer's differentiations being characteristically rational, not only in the sense that such differentiations are based on scientifically proven risk assessment methods applying probabilistic theory to statistical data, but also in a strictly utilitarian sense, given that the criteria applied in reaching such differentiations are those that allow the insurer to reach its goal of correctly measuring and pricing the risks they take at the lowest possible cost. 
Sex as an actuarial factor in the insurance business
Insurance is a risk management tool aimed at reducing the negative impact of an uncertain future event by securing the financial means required to face it. When faced with such a risk, we may deal with it ourselves, for instance by taking steps to eliminate it, or to reduce the probability or severity of the potential loss or even by choosing to retain this risk, budgeting the means with which to face such potential loss. Alternatively we may transfer this risk to an insurer in exchange for a fee, thereby choosing a certain, smaller loss -the payment of a premium -over an uncertain, potentially much larger loss.
At the root of the insurance business is the law of large numbers, which is a principle of probability theory according to which, the larger the number of analogous exposure units independently exposed to loss, the closer the actual loss will be to the value of the expected loss. 22 In a nutshell: no one can predict if and when they will be involved in a car accident but, thanks to the law of large numbers, it is possible to estimate the number of car accidents that will occur in Lisbon in 2014 with a relatively small margin of error.
We, risk-averse individuals, are happy to choose a certain, smaller loss over an uncertain, potentially much larger loss. Insurers, on the other hand, have no reason to be averse to take up our risks, because their pool of clients is large enough for them to be able to measure such risks. They will not be able to predict which of their clients will suffer a loss but they should be capable of estimating, with an acceptable margin of error, how high their aggregate loss will be, and may thus budget accordingly.
Actuarial science is the discipline of applied mathematics concerned with risk assessment in the insurance business. individual risk and price it accordingly. They draw on their hard data so as to come up with different outcome probabilities for men and women.
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If insurer were to charge all policyholders the same premium, regardless of the characteristics of each individual risk, on an individual level the policyholders seeking to cover better-than-average risks would subsidize those which with worse-than-average risks.
This was indeed how life insurance was sold in the 19th century. It did not work out very well for insurers: it has been argued that the existence of competition amongst insurers in the marketplace and the phenomenon known as adverse selection generally prevents this from successfully taking place, because such a scheme would only be attractive to the latter group of policyholders, the former being better served by an insurer which would differentiate between good and bad risks. 24 By definition, insurance is discriminating: its modus operandi is to classify risk-bearers into more or less homogeneous groups and price their insurance according to such classifications, so that each group member will pay the premium that best matches its individual risk. Since the information that they would really wish to obtain is either unavailable or only available at too high a cost for their activity to be lucrative, they have to rely on statistics.
They single out certain factors because a statistical correlation, albeit an imperfect one, has been found between these factors and those that insurers really care about -say, our the World Health Organization's definitions, ' 'sex' refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women', whereas ' 'gender' refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women', available at:
<http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en/> (last visited 28 August 2014). On the subject of the risk assessment factors most widely used in the insurance business, see CIVIC CONSULTING's Study (cited supra n. 1). 26 As stated above in n. 12, this article is concerned with direct forms of discrimination. However, oftentimes recourse to a suspect classification will not be as apparent, surrogate factors being used as proxies. This practice has been detected in a large number of equal employment cases. In such cases statistics may be used as evidence that indirect discrimination is taking place. On this, see J. L. GASTWIRTH, "Methods for assessing the sensitivity of statistical comparisons used in Title VII cases to omitted variables", (1992) rational. The application of a stricter test should follow. However, the scientific basis of the actuaries' work has widely been put forward as ground for some sort of waiver of a stricter or indeed of any further testing.
In order to illustrate why it is vital that a stricter test than the rational standard be applied to differentiations based on suspect classifications, even in the field of insurance, I shall go back in time, to a couple of decisions of the United States Supreme Court taken in the different but related context of racial discrimination in America.
Brown v. Board of Education 30
This was a landmark judgment of the United States Supreme Court, according to which state laws establishing racial segregation in the public educational system were unconstitutional. In this class action, the claimants, parents of about 20 black children attending elementary schools in Kansas, argued that racial segregation allegedly providing separate but equal treatment of both white and black Americans instead perpetuated an inferior treatment of black Americans. The Supreme Court unanimously held that even if segregated black and white schools were proven to be of equal quality in all respects, segregation itself was psychologically harmful to black Americans. Quoting this decision: 'We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.'
Providing this ground-breaking decision with its theoretical foundations was a comparatively straightforward mission to accomplish. By the time it was reached, the scientific community had made it clear enough that segregation was unsupported by 30 347 U,. S. 483 (1954) . This has been called "the Supreme Court's greatest anti-discrimination decision". D.
A. STRAUSS, "Intent and the taming of Brown", (1989) In this case, the United States Supreme Court unanimously overturned a decision by a Florida state court which changed a previous child custody judgment based on a change of circumstances after a white child's white mother, who had been awarded custody of her child, remarried a black man. The child's white father was awarded custody of their child.
Both parents were found to be equally fit for parenthood. The court found that it was in the best interests of the child to be raised by her father because, all other factors being equal, this child would most probably be the victim of social stigmatization if brought up by an interracial couple, an issue which would not arise if she were to be raised by her white father.
In this case the Supreme Court did not question the state judge's factual conclusion that the child would most probably be the victim of social stigmatization if brought up by an interracial couple. Indeed, it explicitly accepted this conclusion.
'The question (…) is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. Going back to Brown: putting an end to segregation often caused some black and white children to suffer psychological harm. There were social disturbances of all sorts in a variety of communities. In some of them education was even interrupted for a while. But the harm caused to these children, black and white, was never found by the Supreme Court as a worthy basis for delay of the desegregation process. 34 The principle upheld in Brown required the Supreme Court to reverse the decision in Palmore. In determining which decision would be in the best interests of the child, the court could not take into consideration the undisputed fact that a large part of this child's community was racially prejudiced and would therefore most probably subject this child to social stigmatization. To take that fact into consideration would be intolerable from a constitutional point of view.
35
In sum, the question whether or not the state judge's factual conclusion was accurate did not bring the discussion in Palmore to an end. The state judge's factual conclusion might have been accurate, and yet it was found to be unusable by the United States Supreme However, it is submitted that it is not as narrowly tailored as it should be. In this section I put forward a twofold test aimed at narrowing the rules allowing insurers to differentiate on the basis of a suspect classification.
Statistical analysis, by using past data to predict the future, can be used as an instrument to perpetuate past injustices, in a way that is incompatible with the promotion of equality.
38
The use of statistical findings, as accurate as they may be, should be similarly deemed intolerable, whenever these findings are based on a suspect classification, if the statistical regularities that are found could be traced back to some form of past discrimination. More rigorously, given the presumption of wrongness, the use of these statistical findings should 36 See D. A. STRAUSS, op. cit. supra n. 20. 37 The expression is borrowed from the strict scrutiny test as formulated by the US Supreme Court. See above the text in the vicinity of n. 30.
38 See M. J. KATZ, op. cit. supra n. 20, at 458: 'Although rational discrimination is based on neutral market principles such as profitability and efficiency, its effects are far from neutral. In the insurance market, rational discrimination plays a part in perpetuating-even exacerbating -the economic disparities be-tween the races.
This seemingly 'faultless' conduct not only is rooted in the harm of past intentional discrimination, it is a harm in its own right.'.
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20 be barred unless there is evidence in support of the conclusion that these differences and regularities have an explanation that is unrelated to some form of past discrimination.
Other reasons have been invoked by courts and legal authors as grounds for the unfairness of differentiations based on suspect classifications. Amongst such reasons, the one that stands out is the argument that features such as one's race or sex are uncontrollable, in the sense that we do not choose to be born of a given race or sex, as opposed to, say, our acquiring a smoking habit. 39 Whilst this argument may very pertinent in other contexts, when it comes to suspect classifications such as race or sex I find it somewhat difficult to take in, due to the implication that being born of a given race or sex might be something to avoid, if possible, or that if we were able to choose them this might lead to a somewhat diminished claim to equal treatment. Indeed, it is nowadays largely accepted that race is, to some extent, a trait that we choose to assume as part of our identity. 40 277, at 264-269, accepts that a strict proportionality test might have condemned higher tariffs for men in motor insurance and for women in health insurance 'because of fragmented and inconclusive statistical evidence that did not take into account different risk profiles and lifestyles of insured persons', as in those cases 'sex was a rather 'crude' and therefore discriminatory method of risk determination'. However, the author rejects that the same argument be applied to life insurance, where 'premiums for life insurance should be allowed to be calculated differently for the simple fact that the average life expectancy of women in the EU is longer than that of men'. The author argues that the Court has possibly 'failed to carry out the necessary balancing between 'party autonomy' and 'equal treatment' in the insurance market' (at 268-269). 45 There is no clear scientific evidence of a biological cause for this gap, it being admitted that biological 
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Once again, is that all we should ask of such findings? That they be unrelated to some form of past discrimination? Whilst existing studies have demonstrated that sex is -or has been -treated as a distinguishing feature of outcomes relevant to insurance, they have failed to establish that it is the only or even a determining feature. Hence, in cases where no relation can be found between a given statistical finding and past discrimination a second question should be asked: why has this factor been chosen to the detriment of so many others?
The mere identification of a statistical correlation does not establish cause and effect.
Correlations may be strong and it may be tenuous. Even in cases where a strong correlation has been found, correlation never implicates causation -that is to say, the existence of a correlation between fact A and outcome B does not establish that A is the cause of B. A strong correlation can be found whenever the chosen factor has triggered the relevant outcome but it is also possible for both to share a common-causal variable, albeit being otherwise unrelated to each other. 47 Hence, a bias can be found in the selection of an actuarial factor to the detriment of others if the former, albeit correlated to the relevant outcome, bears no significant statistical advantage over the latter. the inherent subjectivity in every probabilistic judgment, not in the sense that it is something that might vary from person to person, but in the more ample sense of something that cannot do without interpretation, and as such without human interference and fallibility.
49
No argument is being made here that the mere establishment of a correlation without proof of causation would always render statistical findings unusable. In order for actuaries to conduct their risk assessments, correlation will suffice. Actuaries need not concern themselves with causation, and that is generally acceptable. But, as I have tried to demonstrate, when it comes to the use of a suspect classification extra care is required.
Sometimes it is admittedly very difficult to establish causation. In cases where the mechanisms of causation are still unknown but there is other evidence to support the conclusion that the chosen factor is indeed the best single predictor of the relevant outcome, then such differentiation could still pass the test. However, given the 49 A summary of the contribution of the social sciences to this discussion, with references to the most relevant literature, can be found in ROYAL SOCIETY's op. cit. supra n. 48, at 7-8, 89-90, 94-98 and 111-118. On the argument that risk is essentially the product of social construction, see P. SLOVIC, op. cit. supra n. 48, at pp.
689-701, and the abundant literature referenced in nn. 8 to 13 thereof. 'In this view, risk does not exist 'out there', independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured. Instead, human beings have invented the concept risk to help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing as 'real risk' or 'objective risk'.'' (at 690).
presumption of wrongness that goes along with differentiations based on a suspect classification, when it comes to these and these alone, it is submitted that mere correlation is not a sufficient ground to form the basis of an admissible differentiation.
In order to pass the second leg of our test we must compare sex with every other possible factor and conclude that no other factor would have been more suitable than sex as a predictor of that outcome and that no other factor would be available, even if slightly less suitable for that purpose from an actuarial perspective, if their use might have been less burdensome from a human rights perspective -as recourse to a given suspect classification must be the least restrictive means available for pursuing the interest in question. 50 But it is not so. women. 56 Nonetheless, just as, in service of a greater good, the black and white children in
Brown were expected to suffer some degree of psychological harm in the desegregation process, it is also to be expected that the men and women of our time and age run the risk of paying a little more on average for their insurance. Not surprisingly, change often comes at a cost. sensibilities towards each suspect classification are constantly evolving. Presently, we might safely say that age is still not as sensitive a topic as sex, just as sex is perhaps still not as sensitive a topic as race, although the distance between the two might be decreasing. On the other hand, if we were to ban the use of age as an actuarial factor, the burden on the insurance industry would be much greater than that posed by the relinquishing of sex as an actuarial factor. Therefore, I would not be surprised if the industry were to pass this test successfully and be allowed to use age as an actuarial factor, at least in personal insurance, the proportionality test being a key element of the second part of the twofold test.
Conclusions
When it comes to the use of statistical findings as justification of a differentiation based on one of the suspect classifications set forth in Article 21(1) of the Charter, that they be accurate is not all we should be asking for in order for the presumption of wrongness therein contained to be set aside.
By recognizing that insurers' decisions to differentiate on the ground of a person's sex, or of any other suspect classification, are based on scientifically proven risk assessment methods accurately applying probabilistic theory to statistical data, all we are saying is that they are rational. The application of a stricter test should follow in order for a differentiation based on a suspect classification to fall on the good side of the line between admissible criteria of differentiation and inadmissible forms of discrimination.
Statistical analysis, by using past data to predict the future, can be used as an instrument to perpetuate past injustices in a way that is incompatible with the promotion of equality. The use of accurate statistical findings is intolerable, whenever these findings are based on suspect classifications, if the statistical regularities that are found could be traced back to some form of past discrimination. More rigorously, given the presumption of wrongness, the use of these statistical findings should be banned unless there is evidence in support of the conclusion that these differences and regularities have an explanation that is unrelated to some form of past discrimination.
In addition, the use of a suspect classification as an actuarial factor should also be deemed intolerable unless there is evidence in support of the conclusion that such factor plays a determining role in the relevant chain of events, or that the correlation which has been identified is particularly strong or meaningful in that it relies on the significance of a person's individual characteristics rather than on that person's membership of a historically discriminated social group. In sum, something stronger than mere convenience must have determined the choice of that suspect classification as an actuarial factor, to the detriment of other potentially relevant factors.
I put forward the proposition that a twofold test aimed at narrowing the rules allowing insurers to differentiate on the basis of a suspect classification should be used so as to separate admissible criteria of differentiation from inadmissible forms of discrimination. 
